

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 305298
ORIGIN PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 EUR-12 EA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDA-12
DODE-00 SIG-01 TRSE-00 SOE-01 AF-10 CIAE-00 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02
SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01 DOE-12 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06
/148 R

DRAFTED BY PM/SSP:PPERENYI:JMM
APPROVED BY PM - MR. GELB
PM/DCA - MR. BRECKON
EUR/RPM - MS. KORKY
EUR/EE - MR. JOHNSON (SUBS)
EUR/NE - MR. WOODS
EA/ANP - MR. NELSON
ACDA/M/IR - MR. FLOWEREE
ACDA/WEC - MR. HIRSHFELD
IO/UNP - MR. MACUK
ACDA/D/SSOD - MR. WEILER(SUBS)
PM - MR. MANTEL
PM - MR. KAHAN
ARA/RPP - MR. FINAN
EA/J - MR. FEATHERSTONE
EA/TIMBS-MR. EASTON

-----128806 230310Z /62

R 222032Z DEC 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 305298

AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 305298

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: UN, PCAT

SUBJECT: CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT IN SSOD

REF: (A) NATO 07406 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 299294

1. SUMMARY: AMONG US OBJECTIVES AT UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) THIS SPRING WILL BE INCLUSION OF SOME GENERAL LANGUAGE IN CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS (DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT AND PROGRAM OF ACTION) SUPPORTING SUPPLIER RECIPIENT COOPERATION IN RESTRAINING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. PROGRESS IN OVERCOMING PAST THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE TO RESTRAINT IDEA IN UN WOULD GIVE HELPFUL IMPETUS TO OUR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS OUTSIDE UN CONTEXT. SINCE DRAFTING FOR SSOD DOCUMENTS IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN AT FOURTH PREPARATORY COMMITTEE SESSION (BEGINNING JANUARY 24 IN NEW YORK), THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED STRATEGY AND BEGIN ROUNDING UP SUPPORT. KEY PART OF EFFORT IS CONSULTATION WITH IMPORTANT SUPPLIERS AND THIRD WORLD RECIPIENTS WHO ARE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 305298

MEMBERS OF PREPARATORY COMMITTEE. WE WISH TO APPROACH ADDRESSEE COUNTRIES FIRST, SINCE THEY ARE MEMBERS OF SSOD PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, HAVE SHOWN SOME SIGNS OF SUPPORTING RESTRAINT AND MAY BE ABLE TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS FOR SECOND ROUND OF APPROACHES TO PROBLEM COUNTRIES. FOCUS OF DIS-

CUSSION SHOULD BE ON HOW RESTRAINT MIGHT BE MADE ATTRACTIVE TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. NATO POSTS SHOULD EMPHASIZE NEED FOR COORDINATED TACTICS; ALL SHOULD EXPRESS US DESIRE FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION.

2. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, US EFFORT ON RESTRAINT ISSUE IN UN WAS LAUNCHED BY PRESIDENT CARTER IN OCTOBER 4TH UNGA SPEECH WHICH, INTER ALIA, POINTED OUT NEED FOR COOPERATION OF BOTH SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS, A BASIC US THEME SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT LAST MAY OF GUIDELINES LIMITING OUR OWN TRANSFERS. UNDERLYING IDEA IS THAT THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF THE US POLICY WILL DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE UPON THE COOPERATION OF OTHERS.

3. YOU SHOULD APPROACH APPROPRIATE LEVEL FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH UN DISARMAMENT MATTERS. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE NOT PRESENTING PROPOSALS, BUT MERELY SEEKING AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON AN INFORMAL AND WE HOPE CONTINUING BASIS. PURPOSE IS TO SOLICIT IDEAS, GATHER INFORMATION ON PLANS OF COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT RAISE SUBJECT OF ARMS TRANSFERS AND, TO THE EXTENT

POSSIBLE, COORDINATE OUR TACTICS.

4. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT OUR APPROACH ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE NOW DOES NOT IMPLY LOWER PRIORITY FOR OTHER SUBJECTS, BUT SIMPLY REFLECTS FACT THAT OUR POSITIONS ON OTHER ISSUES ARE STILL BEING DEVELOPED.

5. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD DRAW ON POINTS BELOW EITHER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 305298

TO EXPLAIN RESTRAINT ISSUE IN SSOD (CARACAS, BELGRADE, MEXICO CITY, LIMA, KUALA LUMPUR, BOGOTA) TO TO EXPLAIN HOW WE INTEND TO APPROACH THIRD WORLD RECIPIENTS (OTHER ADDRESSEES). WE WOULD APPRECIATE REPORTS ON REACTIONS, INCLUDING ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PRESENT THE BASIC CASE FOR RESTRAINT (PARA 6, POINTS D THROUGH G BELOW) IN THIRD WORLD.

6. FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS SHOULD BE USED IN APPROACHES TO HOST GOVERNMENTS:

A. THE SSOD SHOULD NOT IGNORE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, WHICH ARE AN IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL ISSUE.

B. THE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS SHOULD BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED, IN THE DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT AND PROGRAM OF ACTION, RECOGNIZING THAT A BALANCED APPROACH SHOULD TREAT THE ISSUE AS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE

BROADER CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL SUBJECT.

C. MOREOVER, WE DO NOT SEE ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINTS BEING IMPOSED ON RECIPIENTS BY SUPPLIERS. ONE WAY OF MAKING THIS CLEAR IN CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS WOULD BE TO INDICATE POSSIBILITY OF A VARIETY OF WAYS OF DEALING WITH PROBLEM, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, RECIPIENT INITIATIVES, PERHAPS ON A REGIONAL BASIS; SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT ANY REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS; AND MUTUAL SUPPLIER/RECIPIENT RESTRAINTS.

D. WE BELIEVE A GOOD ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE THAT RESTRAINT WILL SERVE RECIPIENT INTERESTS, NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF ENHANCED SECURITY, BUT ALSO FROM POINT OF VIEW OF DEVELOP-
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 305298

MENT, AND COST-EFFECTIVE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS.

E. SECURITY INTERESTS MAY, FOR EXAMPLE, BE BETTER SERVED BY RESTRAINT IN THE PURCHASE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAN BY

MORE SPENDING ON DEFENSE. SOME ELABORATE NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS CAN RAISE TENSIONS, CREATE UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE PURCHASERS' INTENTIONS AND LAUNCH NEW ROUNDS OF COMPETITION.

F. THE MOST ELABORATE AND EXPENSIVE NEW MILITARY EQUIPMENT MAY NOT PROVIDE AN EFFICIENT OR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE FOR MANY COUNTRIES. SUCH SYSTEMS MAY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO ABSORB AND MAINTAIN OR EVEN IMPRACTICAL TO USE, IF HOSTILITIES OCCUR.

G. WHILE ALL COUNTRIES HAVE A LEGITIMATE NEED TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS FOR THEIR DEFENSE, MANY ARE COMPELLED BY UNRESTRAINED REGIONAL ARMS COMPETITION TO SPEND MORE THAN THEY WISH FOR DEFENSE. RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS COULD HELP RECIPIENTS MAKE BETTER USE OF THEIR RESOURCES. ARMS SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS HAVE COMMON OBLIGATIONS TO PRESERVE THE GLOBAL PATRIMONY BY HUSBANDING SCARCE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE SOCIAL PURPOSES.

H. OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM IS GUIDED BY TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES:

-- ALL STATES HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND THESE MUST BE MET.

-- BOTH PRODUCER AND CONSUMER NATIONS ARE CONCERNED, AND A SOLUTION MUST REFLECT THE INTERESTS AND IDEAS OF BOTH.

I. WE HAVE TAKEN A SPECIAL INTEREST IN THE ARMS TRANSFER
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 305298

ISSUE, BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZE OUR RESPONSIBILITY AS A MAJOR SUPPLIER.

J. WE DO NOT SEE THE SUBJECT AS A DISTRACTION FROM OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SUBJECTS MUST BE ADEQUATELY TREATED IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND PROGRAM OF ACTION.

7. FOLLOWING IS TO BE DRAWN ON AT POST'S DISCRETION:
WE INTEND TO ARGUE THE CASE FOR RESTRAINT FORCEFULLY AT SSOD, BOTH IN INFORMAL CONTACTS AND GENERAL DEBATE. WE SEE SOME ADVANTAGES, HOWEVER, IN ENCOURAGING INITIATIVES BY OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IF THIS IS POSSIBLE.

8. FOR NATO POSTS, WELLINGTON, AND STOCKHOLM. WE DO NOT THINK ARGUMENTS FOR RESTRAINT BY THEMSELVES WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO DEVELOP SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION, AND ARE CONSIDERING A VARIETY OF INCENTIVES FOR THIRD WORLD, BUT

HAVE REACHED NO CONCLUSIONS.

9. FOLLOWING TO BE DRQWN UPON BY NATO POSTS ONLY: WE ARE CONSIDERING WHETHER OF NOT IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS TO EMBED CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE IN BROADER CONTEXT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IS PROBABLY VIEWED AS LESS DISCRIMINATORY THAN RESTRAINTS ON TRANSFERS, SINCE ITS EFFECT IS NOT NECESSARILY CONFINED TO RECIPIENT NATIONS. WE NOTE THAT IN UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE THIS YEAR, JAPANESE RESOLUTION WHICH TREATED ARMS TRANSFERS AS MORE OR LESS ISOLATED SUBJECT MADE NO PROGRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS RISK THAT WE MAY LOSE FLEXIBILITY IN PURSUING OUR ARMS TRANSFERS STRATEGY IF THIS ISSUE IS RELATED TO OTHER CONVENTIONAL ARMS CON-
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 305298

TROL ISSUES WHICH WOULD INVOLVE EFFORTS TO GET SUPPLIERS TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL ARMS LEVELS. ADDITIONAL DANGER WE SEE IS THAT THE MORE WE SAY ABOUT TRANSFER ISSUE, THE MORE PRESSURE WE CREATE TO BALANCE DOCUMENT WITH SPECIFICS AFFECTING SECURITY OF SUPPLIERS, WITH ATTENDANT DANGER OF DRAGGING ISSUES SUCH AS MBFR INTO SSOD CONTEXT. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, WE THINK THAT CANADIAN DRAFT PROGRAM OF ACTION CIRCULATED AMONG WESTERN DELS (REF A.) IS ONE USEFUL APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO IT AND MAY WISH TO STRENGTHEN REFERENCE TO ARMS TRANSFERS (TEXT IN PARA 15). WE ARE CONSIDERING ABOVE DILEMMAS, BUT HAVE REACHED NO FIRM CONCLUSIONS.

10. FOR BELGRADE: ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT YUGOSLAV VIEWS

ON RESTRAINT MAY DIFFER FROM OUR OWN, WE NOTE THAT YUGOSLAV LETTER ON SSOD TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL SUGGESTED THAT ARMS TRANSFERS TO AREAS OF CRISIS OR CONFLICT SHOULD BE RESTRICTED. DOES YUGOSLAV INTEND TO PURSUE THIS AT SSOD? WE FIND IDEA INTERESTING AND WONDER IF YUGOSLAVIA MIGHT BE USEFUL IN WINNING THIRD WORLD SUPPORT FOR RESTRAINTS ON TRANSFERS.

11. FOR MEXICO CITY: MEXICO HAS ALSO MENTIONED RESTRAINT IN DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. DOES MEXICO INTEND TO PURSUE IDEA, AND WHAT IS POST'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW MEXICO MIGHT BE HELPFUL?

12. FOR OTTAWA. WHAT ARE CANADIAN INTENTIONS REGARDING THE ARMS TRANSFER PROVISIONS IN THEIR DRAFT PROGRAM OF ACTION?

13. FOR BRUSSELS: BELGIUM IN UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE INITIATIVE SUGGESTED REGIONAL DISARMAMENT STUDY FOR SSOD CONSIDERATION. PROPOSAL WAS FINALLY WATERED DOWN TO REQUEST THAT STATES PROVIDE VIEW ON MATTER PRIOR TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 305298

SPECIAL SESSION. FIRST COMMITTEE VERSIONS OF PROPOSAL DID NOT MENTION CONTROVERSIAL RESTRAINT SUBJECT, BUT EARLY DRAFTS WE SAW DID. WE THINK REGIONAL APPROACHES ARE RELEVANT TO RESTRAINT, AND WE ARE THEREFORE INTERESTED IN BELGIAN PLANS FOR PURSUING THIER INITIATIVE.

14. FOR TOKYO: JAPAN HAS SUBMITTED WORKING PAPER ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINTS TO SSOD PREPCOM (REF B). THEREFORE, IN ADDITION TO USING TALKING POINTS IN PARAS 6, 7, 8 ABOVE, POST SHOULD INDICATE TO JAPANESE THAT WE HAVE UNDER PREPARATION MORE DETAILED COMMENTS ON JAPANESE PAPER AND APPROACH WHICH WILL BE COMMUNICATED IN NEAR FUTURE (BEGIN FYI: JAPANESE ARE OUT IN FRONT OF MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE USG DOES NOT AGREE WITH ALL ASPECTS OF JAPANESE APPROACH, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY ARE INFORMED EARLY OF OTHER APPROACHES REQUESTED IN THIS CABLE, TO AVOID OFFENDING GOJ. END FYI).

15. FOR NATO AND STOCKHOLD: FOLLOWING ARE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF CANADIAN TEXT. BEGIN TEXT.

"III - CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

STATES SHOULD ENDEAVOR ON A REGIONAL BASIS TO DEVELOP ARRANGEMENTS FOR LIMITING LEVELS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS.

WHILE INITIATIVES FOR DEVELOPING SUCH ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD

COME FROM WITHIN THE REGION CONCERNED STATES OUTSIDE THE REGION, ESPECIALLY POTENTIAL ARMS SUPPLIERS, SHOULD LEND SUPPORT TO REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM ACTIONS IN CONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRICTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED...

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 305298

SUPPLIER STATES SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THEIR ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT EXACERBATE ARMS COMPETITION, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RECOGNIZING THE NECESSITY FOR STATES TO ACQUIRE THE MEANS TO SAFEGUARD THEIR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

IV - OTHER MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT

...STATES, ON A REGIONAL BASIS, SHOULD ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS TO LIMIT THEIR MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND TO RESTRAIN ARMS TRANSFERS." END TEXT. CANADIAN DRAFT SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED EXCEPT BY NATO POSTS.

16. FOR LIMA. IT WAS A PERUVIAN INITIATIVE WHICH LED TO THE DECLARATION OF AYACHUCHO OF DECEMBER 1974. SIGNATORIES OF THIS DECLARATION (THE SIX ANDEAN COUNTRIES, ARGENTINA, AND PANAMA) AGREED TO SEEK LIMITATIONS ON THEIR ARMS ACQUISITIONS. CAN PERU BE PERSUADED TO TAKE A LEAD IN SUPPORTING REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS?

17. FOR KUALA LUMPUR: MALAYSIA HAS BEEN A LEADING STATE IN THE FORMATION OF ASEAN. CAN MALAYSIA BE PERSUADED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS?

18. FOR WELLINGTON: FYI: NEW ZEALAND COSPONSORED JAPANESE RESOLUTION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS IN LAST YEAR'S UNGA.

VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 305298

ORIGIN PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ACDA-12 IO-13 ISO-00 AF-10 EA-10 /051 R

66011

DRAFTED BY PM/SSP:PPERENYI:LD

APPROVED BY PM/SSP: R. MANTEL

PM/DCA-MR9 ARIETTI (SUBS)

ACDA/WEC-MR. HIRSHFELD

IO/UNP-MR. MACUK

AF/W-MR. MCGUIRE

ACDA/D/SSOD-MR. WEILER

ACDA/IR-MR FLOWEREE

EA/PHL-MR. FLECK

-----027203 291546Z /43

R 290115Z DEC 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 305298

FOL RPT STATE 305298 SENT ACTION OTTAWA, BRUSSELS, BONN, LONDON, STOCKHOLM, OSLO, TOKYO, BELGRADE, CARACAS, MEXICO, BOGOTA, LIMA, WELLINGTON & KUALA LUMPUR INFO TO USUN NEW YORK, MOSCOW, PARIS & USNATO DTD 22 DEC 77

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 305298

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: UN, PCAT

SUBJECT: CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT IN SSOD

REF: (A) NATO 07406 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 299294
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 305298

1. SUMMARY: AMONG US OBJECTIVES AT UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) THIS SPRING WILL BE INCLUSION OF SOME GENERAL LANGUAGE IN CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS (DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT AND PROGRAM OF ACTION) SUPPORTING SUPPLIER RECIPIENT COOPERATION IN RESTRAINING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. PROGRESS IN OVERCOMING PAST THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE TO RESTRAINT IDEA IN UN WULD GIVE HELPFUL IMPETUS TO OUR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT MORE CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS OUTSIDE UN CONTEXT. SINCE DRAFTING FOR SSOD DOCUMENTS IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN AT FOURTH PREPARATORY COMMITTEE SESSION (BEGINNING JANUARY 24 IN NEW YORK), THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED STRATEGY AND BEGIN ROUNDING UP SUPPORT. KEY PART OF EFFORT IS CONSULTATION WITH IMPORTANT SUPPLIERS AND THIRD WORLD RECIPIENTS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF PREPARATORY COMMITTEE. WE WISH TO APPROACH ADDRESSEE COUNTRIES FIRST, SINCE THEY ARE MEMBERS OF SSOD PREPARATORY COMMITTEE, HAVE SHOWN SOME SIGNS OF SUPPORTING RESTRAINT AND MAY BE ABLE TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS FOR SECOND ROUND OF APPROACHES TO PROBLEM COUNTRIES. FOCUS OF DIS-

CUSSION SHOULD BE ON HOW RESTRAINT MIGHT BE MADE ATTRACTIVE TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. NATO POSTS SHOULD EMPHASIZE NEED FOR COORDINATED TACTICS; ALL SHOULD EXPRESS US DESIRE FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION.

2. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION, US EFFORT ON RESTRAINT ISSUE IN UN WAS LAUNCHED BY PRESIDENT CARTER IN OCTOBER 4TH UNGA SPEECH WHICH, INTER ALIA, POINTED OUT NEED FOR COOPERATION OF BOTH SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS, A BASIC US THEME SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT LAST MAY OF GUIDELINES LIMITING OUR OWN TRANSFERS. UNDERLYING IDEA IS THAT THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF THE US POLICY WILL DEPEND
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 305298

IN LARGE MEASURE UPON THE COOPERATION OF OTHERS.

3. YOU SHOULD APPROACH APPROPRIATE LEVEL FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH UN DISARMAMENT MATTERS. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE NOT PRESENTING PROPOSALS, BUT MERELY SEEKING AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON AN INFORMAL AND WE HOPE CONTINUING BASIS. PURPOSE IS TO SOLICIT IDEAS, GATHER INFORMATION ON PLANS OF COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT RAISE SUBJECT OF ARMS TRANSFERS AND, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, COORDINATE OUR TACTICS.

4. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT OUR APPROACH ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE NOW DOES NOT IMPLY LOWER PRIORITY FOR OTHER SUBJECTS, BUT SIMPLY REFLECTS FACT THAT OUR POSITIONS ON OTHER ISSUES ARE STILL BEING DEVELOPED.

5. ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD DRAW ON POINTS BELOW EITHER TO EXPLAIN RESTRAINT ISSUE IN SSOD (CARACAS, BELGRADE, MEXICO CITY, LIMA, KUALA LUMPUR, BOGOTA) TO TO EXPLAIN HOW WE INTEND TO APPROACH THIRD WORLD RECIPIENTS (OTHER ADDRESSEES). WE WOULD APPRECIATE REPORTS ON REACTIONS, INCLUDING ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT PRESENT THE BASIC CASE FOR RESTRAINT (PARA 6, POINTS D THROUGH G BELOW) IN THIRD WORLD.

6. FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS SHOULD BE USED IN APPROACHES TO HOST GOVERNMENTS:

A. THE SSOD SHOULD NOT IGNORE CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, WHICH ARE AN IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL ISSUE.

B. THE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS SHOULD BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED, IN THE DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT AND PROGRAM OF ACTION, RECOGNIZING THAT A BALANCED APPROACH SHOULD TREAT THE ISSUE AS ONLY ONE ASPECT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 305298

BROADER CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL SUBJECT.

C. MOREOVER, WE DO NOT SEE ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINTS BEING IMPOSED ON RECIPIENTS BY SUPPLIERS. ONE WAY OF MAKING THIS CLEAR IN CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS WOULD BE TO INDICATE POSSIBILITY OF A VARIETY OF WAYS OF DEALING WITH PROBLEM, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, RECIPIENT INITIATIVES, PERHAPS ON A REGIONAL BASIS; SUPPLIER RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT ANY REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS; AND MUTUAL SUPPLIER/RECIPIENT RESTRAINTS.

D. WE BELIEVE A GOOD ARGUMENT CAN BE MADE THAT RESTRAINT WILL SERVE RECIPIENT INTERESTS, NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF ENHANCED SECURITY, BUT ALSO FROM POINT OF VIEW OF DEVELOPMENT, AND COST-EFFECTIVE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS.

E. SECURITY INTERESTS MAY, FOR EXAMPLE, BE BETTER SERVED BY RESTRAINT IN THE PURCHASE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAN BY MORE SPENDING ON DEFENSE. SOME ELABORATE NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS CAN RAISE TENSIONS, CREATE UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE PURCHASERS' INTENTIONS AND LAUNCH NEW ROUNDS OF COMPETITION.

F. THE MOST ELABORATE AND EXPENSIVE NEW MILITARY EQUIP-

MENT MAY NOT PROVIDE AN EFFICIENT OR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE FOR MANY COUNTRIES. SUCH SYSTEMS MAY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO ABSORB AND MAINTAIN OR EVEN IMPRACTICAL TO USE, IF HOSTILITIES OCCUR.

G. WHILE ALL COUNTRIES HAVE A LEGITIMATE NEED TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS FOR THEIR DEFENSE, MANY ARE COMPELLED BY UNRESTRAINED REGIONAL ARMS COMPETITION TO SPEND MORE THAN CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 305298

THEY WISH FOR DEFENSE. RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS COULD HELP RECIPIENTS MAKE BETTER USE OF THEIR RESOURCES. ARMS SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS HAVE COMMON OBLIGATIONS TO PRESERVE THE GLOBAL PATRIMONY BY HUSBANDING SCARCE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE SOCIAL PURPOSES.

H. OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM IS GUIDED BY TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES:

-- ALL STATES HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND THESE MUST BE MET.

-- BOTH PRODUCER AND CONSUMER NATIONS ARE CONCERNED, AND A SOLUTION MUST REFLECT THE INTERESTS AND IDEAS OF BOTH.

I. WE HAVE TAKEN A SPECIAL INTEREST IN THE ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE, BECAUSE WE RECOGNIZE OUR RESPONSIBILITY AS A MAJOR SUPPLIER.

J. WE DO NOT SEE THE SUBJECT AS A DISTRACTION FROM OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SUBJECTS MUST BE ADEQUATELY TREATED IN THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND PROGRAM OF ACTION.

7. FOLLOWING IS TO BE DRAWN ON AT POST'S DISCRETION: WE INTEND TO ARGUE THE CASE FOR RESTRAINT FORCEFULLY AT SSOD, BOTH IN INFORMAL CONTACTS AND GENERAL DEBATE. WE SEE SOME ADVANTAGES, HOWEVER, IN ENCOURAGING INITIATIVES BY OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES IF THIS IS POSSIBLE.

8. FOR NATO POSTS, WELLINGTON, AND STOCKHOLM. WE DO NOT THINK ARGUMENTS FOR RESTRAINT BY THEMSELVES WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO DEVELOP SUPPORT FOR OUR POSITION, AND ARE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 305298

CONSIDERING A VARIETY OF INCENTIVES FOR THIRD WORLD, BUT HAVE REACHED NO CONCLUSIONS.

9. FOLLOWING TO BE DRQWN UPON BY NATO POSTS ONLY: WE ARE CONSIDERING WHETHER OF NOT IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS TO EMBED CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER ISSUE IN BROADER CONTEXT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IS PROBABLY VIEWED AS LESS DISCRIMINATORY THAN RESTRAINTS ON TRANSFERS, SINCE ITS EFFECT IS NOT NECESSARILY CONFINED TO RECIPIENT NATIONS. WE NOTE THAT IN UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE DEBATE THIS YEAR, JAPANESE RESOLUTION WHICH TREATED ARMS TRANSFERS AS MORE OR LESS ISOLATED SUBJECT MADE NO PROGRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS RISK THAT WE MAY LOSE FLEXIBILITY IN PURSUING OUR ARMS TRANSFERS STRATEGY IF THIS ISSUE IS RELATED TO OTHER CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WHICH WOULD INVOLVE EFFORTS TO GET SUPPLIERS TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL ARMS LEVELS. ADDITIONAL DANGER WE SEE IS THAT THE MORE WE SAY ABOUT TRANSFER ISSUE, THE MORE PRESSURE WE CREATE TO BALANCE DOCUMENT WITH SPECIFICS AFFECTING SECURITY OF SUPPLIERS, WITH ATTENDANT DANGER OF DRAGGING ISSUES SUCH AS MBFR INTO SSOD CONTEXT. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, WE THINK THAT CANADIAN DRAFT PROGRAM OF ACTION CIRCULATED AMONG WESTERN DELS (REF A.) IS ONE USEFUL APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT WEDDED TO IT AND MAY WISH TO STRENGTHEN REFERENCE TO ARMS TRANSFERS (TEXT IN PARA 15). WE ARE CONSIDERING ABOVE DILEMMAS, BUT HAVE REACHED NO FIRM CONCLUSIONS.

10. FOR BELGRADE: ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT YUGOSLAV VIEWS

ON RESTRAINT MAY DIFFER FROM OUR OWN, WE NOTE THAT YUGOSLAV LETTER ON SSOD TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL SUGGESTED THAT ARMS TRANSFERS TO AREAS OF CRISIS OR CONFLICT SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 305298

BE RESTRICTED. DOES YUGOSLAV INTEND TO PURSUE THIS AT SSOD? WE FIND IDEA INTERESTING AND WONDER IF YUGOSLAVIA MIGHT BE USEFUL IN WINNING THIRD WORLD SUPPORT FOR RESTRAINTS ON TRANSFERS.

11. FOR MEXICO CITY: MEXICO HAS ALSO MENTIONED RESTRAINT IN DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. DOES MEXICO INTEND TO PURSUE IDEA, AND WHAT IS POST'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW MEXICO MIGHT BE HELPFUL?

12. FOR OTTAWA. WHAT ARE CANADIAN INTENTIONS REGARDING THE ARMS TRANSFER PROVISIONS IN THEIR DRAFT PROGRAM OF ACTION?

13. FOR BRUSSELS: BELGIUM IN UNGA FIRST COMMITTEE INITIATIVE SUGGESTED REGIONAL DISARMAMENT STUDY FOR SSOD CONSIDERATION. PROPOSAL WAS FINALLY WATERED DOWN TO REQUEST THAT STATES PROVIDE VIEW ON MATTER PRIOR TO SPECIAL SESSION. FIRST COMMITTEE VERSIONS OF PROPOSAL DID NOT MENTION CONTROVERSIAL RESTRAINT SUBJECT, BUT EARLY

DRAFTS WE SAW DID. WE THINK REGIONAL APPROACHES ARE RELEVANT TO RESTRAINT, AND WE ARE THEREFORE INTERESTED IN BELGIAN PLANS FOR PURSUING THIER INITIATIVE.

14. FOR TOKYO: JAPAN HAS SUBMITTED WORKING PAPER ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINTS TO SSOD PREPCOM (REF B). THEREFORE, IN ADDITION TO USING TALKING POINTS IN PARAS 6, 7, 8 ABOVE, POST SHOULD INDICATE TO JAPANESE THAT WE HAVE UNDER PREPARATION MORE DETAILED COMMENTS ON JAPANESE PAPER AND APPROACH WHICH WILL BE COMMUNICATED IN NEAR FUTURE (BEGIN FYI: JAPANESE ARE OUT IN FRONT OF MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE USG DOES NOT AGREE WITH ALL ASPECTS OF JAPANESE APPROACH, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY ARE INFORMED EARLY OF OTHER APPROACHES REQUESTED IN THIS CABLE, TO AVOID OFFENDING GOJ. END FYI).

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 305298

15. FOR NATO AND STOCKHOLD: FOLLOWING ARE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF CANADIAN TEXT. BEGIN TEXT.

"III - CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS

STATES SHOULD ENDEAVOR ON A REGIONAL BASIS TO DEVELOP ARRANGEMENTS FOR LIMITING LEVELS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS.

WHILE INITIATIVES FOR DEVELOPING SUCH ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD

COME FROM WITHIN THE REGION CONCERNED STATES OUTSIDE THE REGION, ESPECIALLY POTENTIAL ARMS SUPPLIERS, SHOULD LEND SUPPORT TO REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM ACTIONS IN CONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRICTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED...

SUPPLIER STATES SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THEIR ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT EXACERBATE ARMS COMPETITION, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RECOGNIZING THE NECESSITY FOR STATES TO ACQUIRE THE MEANS TO SAFEGUARD THEIR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

IV - OTHER MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT

...STATES, ON A REGIONAL BASIS, SHOULD ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS TO LIMIT THEIR MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND TO RESTRAIN ARMS TRANSFERS." END TEXT. CANADIAN DRAFT SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED EXCEPT BY NATO POSTS.

16. FOR LIMA. IT WAS A PERUVIAN INTIATIVE WHICH LED TO THE DECLARATION OF AYACHUCHO OF DECEMBER 1974. SIGNATORIES OF THIS DECLARATION (THE SIX ANDEAN COUNTRIES, ARGENTINA, AND PANAMA) AGREED TO SEEK LIMITATIONS ON THEIR ARMS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 305298

ACQUISITIONS. CAN PERU BE PERSUADED TO TAKE A LEAD IN
SUPPORTING REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS?

17. FOR KUALA LUMPUR: MALAYSIA HAS BEEN A LEADING
STATE IN THE FORMATION OF ASEAN. CAN MALAYSIA BE PER-
SUADED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS?

18. FOR WELLINGTON: FYI: NEW ZEALAND COSPONSORED
JAPANESE RESOLUTION ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS IN
LAST YEAR'S UNGA. VANCE
VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 22-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE305298
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PM/SSP:PPERENYI:JMM
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770478-1061
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197712111/baaaaeutk.tel
Line Count: 666
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 74f65dfc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN PM
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 13
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 119815
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT IN SSOD
TAGS: PCAT, UN
To: OTTAWA BRUSSELS MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/74f65dfc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009